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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UCC ARTICLE 9’S 
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS: A 
COMPARATIVE NOTE 
Catherine Walsh* 
INTRODUCTION 
Debtor-creditor and insolvency laws in western legal traditions 
generally treat a defaulting debtor’s assets as subject to liquidation by 
its creditors or their insolvency representative, with the proceeds then 
distributed among them in proportion to their claims. Secured 
creditors seek to escape this baseline principle by bargaining in advance 
for the right to have assets of their debtors in which they have 
contracted for security preferentially appropriated to the payment of 
their debts. Thus, a contract for security has been described as a private 
bargain “between A and B that C take nothing”1 with C representing 
the collectivity of the collateral-giver’s other creditors. 
In view of the distributional consequences, legal systems 
traditionally have found it necessary to impose certain limitations on 
party autonomy in security agreements. In recent decades, these 
constraints have been increasingly dismantled for creditors who take 
security in what is popularly referred to as “cash collateral” — meaning 
not just cash in the strict sense of hard currency but also intangible 
rights that are highly liquid in the sense that the secured creditor can 
almost immediately acquire their cash value. 
This article focuses on cash collateral in the form of a right to 
payment of money credited to an account with a bank or other 
                                                 
* Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University. 
1 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994).   
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financial institution (deposit account). Secured transactions regimes in 
effect in the Canadian provinces and territories traditionally have 
subjected deposit accounts to the same public notice and temporal 
priority rules that apply to security agreements covering other 
intangible assets in the form of a monetary obligation owed to the 
debtor. In contrast, deposit accounts under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the United States are governed by a special set of 
rules organized around the concept of “control.” 
The Article 9 deposit account regime is increasingly promoted 
internationally. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions is particularly notable.2 It represents the first attempt at 
the international law level to articulate a comprehensive regime of 
security for movable assets. The close affinity between U.C.C. Article 
9 and the Guide’s recommendations is such that, in the words of 
Tomáš Richter, it “could be called the ‘New York/ Vienna 
consensus.’”3  Certainly, with respect to the treatment of deposit 
accounts,4 the recommendations of the Guide replicate almost 
completely the Article 9 rules.5 
Reforms aimed at aligning the treatment of deposit accounts 
in Canadian secured transactions law with the Article 9 (and 
UNCITRAL) control approach have recently been proposed. As will 
                                                 
2   See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, 
U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-
Guide_09-04-10English.pdf (hereinafter UNICITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE). For 
ease of reference, the terminology and recommendations of the Guide are published 
in a separate publication: UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS: TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, U.N. Sales No. 
E.09.V.13 (2010), available at  
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/Terminology-and-
Recs.18-1-10.pdf (hereinafter UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS).  
3   Tomáš Richter, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit: A 
Minskian Sequel 4 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished article), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390013. 
4   Instead of “deposit account,” the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
uses the conceptually more accurate, but also more cumbersome, term “right to 
payment of funds credited to a deposit account.” For an explanation of this term, see 
UNCITRAL TERMINOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2. 
5   Id. at 49, 103-04, 125-26, 173-75. 
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be seen, adoption of the control approach will in effect exempt secured 
creditors who obtain control of a deposit account from the public 
notice and temporal priority rules that until now have applied to 
security rights in all types of monetary obligations. It will also result in 
a departure from the basic premise of secured creditor equality implicit 
in the traditional temporal priority rule by privileging the depository 
bank over other secured credit providers. 
The principal aim of this article is to explore the justification 
for the exceptional treatment of deposit accounts under the Article 9 
control approach.  Parts I and II summarize the current Canadian rules 
and compares them with the Article 9 regime. Part III reviews the 
official justifications for the Article 9 approach and finds them less 
than persuasive. Part IV explores the relatively recent push to import 
the Article 9 treatment of deposit accounts into Canadian secured 
transactions law and locates the reform pressure in the desire to 
facilitate the use of cash collateral in the form of deposit accounts by 
financial actors, notably in the derivatives and securities lending 
markets. In light of that finding, Part V concludes by asking whether 
privileging the extension of credit to the financial sector represents 
wise policy if it comes at the potential expense of reducing the 
availability of and increasing the cost of credit to the real economy. 
I.         THE TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH TO THE 
TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS IN SECURED
TRANSACTIONS LAW 
Funds deposited to a bank account are not set aside as 
belonging to the customer.  Rather, they become the property of the 
bank and are replaced by the obligation of the bank to pay the 
equivalent amount to the customer.  Thus, in general property law, a 
deposit account has come to be characterized simply as a debt owed 
by the bank to its customer. It constitutes a sub-species of pure 
intangible property since its value is not reified in any tangible 
document capable of being negotiated, such as a cheque or a 
certificated investment security.6 
                                                 
6   See, e.g., Benjamin Geva, Rights in Bank Deposits and Account Balances in 
Common Law Canada, 28 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2012); Clayton Bangsund, The 
2015 Walsh 4:1 
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Consistent with this general conceptualization, the secured 
transactions regimes in effect in the Canadian provinces and territories7 
traditionally have subjected deposit accounts to the same general rules 
that apply to other intangible assets that take the form of a monetary 
obligation owed to the grantor. Thus, a security right in a deposit 
account must be “perfected” by public registration of a notice of the 
security right to take effect against third parties8 and priority among 
secured creditors is ordered temporally according to the order of 
registration. 9 On the debtor’s default, the secured creditor is entitled 
to collect payment of the value of the deposit account directly from 
the bank with whom the deposit account is held and may then apply 
the proceeds of collection in satisfaction of the obligation secured by 
its security interest.10 
If the bank with whom the deposit account is held wishes to 
take a security interest in its customer’s account to secure an obligation 
owing to it by the customer, it does not enjoy any special exemption 
from these rules. Thus, the bank must register notice of its security 
right and its priority against outside secured creditors who have 
previously acquired a perfected security interest in the deposit account 
generally will be subject to the first-to-register priority rule. The 
application of that rule is subject, however, to the bank’s right, in its 
capacity as the debtor on the deposit account, to set-off any obligations 
owing to it by its customer that arise before it receives notice of a 
                                                 
Deposit Account & Chose in Action at Common Law & Under the PPSA: A Historical Review, 
30 BANKING FIN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2014); Bruce A. Markell, From Property to Contract 
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 963, 966-67 (1999). 
7   In the province of Quebec where the civil law tradition prevails, secured 
transactions law is primarily found in the Civil Code rules governing hypothecary 
security. See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, bk. 6 (Can.). While the common 
law tradition prevails in the  other nine provinces and the three territories, secured 
transactions law is primarily found in the Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs) 
proclaimed in force between 1976 and 2001.See, e.g., Ontario Personal Property 
Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (Can.) [hereinafter Ontario PPSA]. See generally 
R.C.C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & RODERICK WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY 
SECURITY LAW (2d ed. 2012). 
8 See, e.g., Ontario PPSA, supra note 7, at §§ 19, 20, 23. 
9 Id. at § 30(1)(1). 
10 Id. at § 61(1). 
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security right that otherwise would have priority.11 The bank’s set-off 
right, whether arising by operation of law or contractually, may be 
exercised regardless of whether or not it concurrently holds a security 
interest in the deposit account.12 
II.         THE ARTICLE 9 “CONTROL” REGIME 
Under Article 9, the concept of control by a secured creditor 
plays a key role in the rules governing the perfection and priority of a 
security right in a deposit account. Control is not a unitary concept—
its meaning varies according to whether the secured creditor is the 
bank with whom the grantor maintains the deposit account or an 
outside creditor.13 If the bank is the secured creditor, it automatically 
has control upon its customer’s grant of security to it.14 If the secured 
creditor is an outside creditor, it can obtain control either by becoming 
the bank’s customer with respect to its debtor’s deposit account or by 
entering into a control agreement with the bank and the debtor under 
which the bank agrees that it will comply with instructions originated 
by the secured creditor directing disposition of the funds in the deposit 
account without further consent by the debtor.15 
Obtaining control is an alternative to registration as a mode of 
perfecting a security interest in deposit accounts. This is so even 
though control does not give public notice of the potential existence 
of the security right to creditors and other potential competing 
claimants.  The secured creditor’s control need not be exclusive: a 
secured creditor has control even if the debtor retains the right to 
direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account as if it were 
unencumbered.16 Outside parties cannot require the bank to disclose 
whether a security right exists in the deposit account: a bank that has 
entered into a control agreement is not required to confirm the 
existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do 
                                                 
11   CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664. 
12   Id. at 666-67. And see infra, Section IV, for the distinction between a 
mere set-off right and a set-off right that, when combined with other terms, amounts 
to a security interest in substance. 
13   U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2014). 
14   Id. at § 9-104(a)(1).  
15   Id. at § 9-104(a)(2)-(3). 
16   Id. at § 9-104(b). 
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so by its customer.17 The result is a “secret lien,” the very mischief that 
the general requirement for perfection was intended to alleviate.18 
A secured creditor who obtains control of a deposit account 
has priority over a secured creditor who perfects its security right by 
registration even if registration preceded the obtaining of control.19 
The privileged status accorded to security rights perfected by control 
at the level of priority carries over to enforcement on default. If the 
secured creditor has control by virtue of its status as the depository 
bank, it may simply apply the funds credited to the deposit account to 
the obligation secured by the deposit account.20 If the secured creditor 
is an outside creditor who has obtained control by virtue of a control 
agreement or because it has become the bank’s customer on the 
account, it may instruct the bank to pay the balance on deposit.21 If, 
however, the secured creditor is relying on perfection by registration 
as opposed to control, it may enforce its security right only by 
obtaining a court order under other law compelling the bank to pay 
the funds to it.22 The secured creditor has no right to demand payment 
simply on notification to the bank. In contrast, the depository bank, in 
its capacity as secured creditor with automatic control, is entitled to 
simply pay itself out of the funds in the account, and outside secured 
                                                 
17   Id. at § 9-342. 
18   Lynn M. LoPucki, Arvin I. Abraham & Bernd P. Delahaye, Optimizing 
English and American Security Interests, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1785, 1800 (2013); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 
EMORY  BANKR.  DEV.  J. 421, 426 (2005). 
19   Under Article 9, control is the only method available for perfecting a 
security right in a deposit account as original collateral: U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1) (2014). 
However, a security right in a deposit account perfected by control may come into 
conflict with one perfected by registration where the deposit account is claimed as 
proceeds of collateral perfected by public registration pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-315(c) 
and (d). In that event, the security interest perfected by control has priority under 
U.C.C. § 9-327(1). Under the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, while a security right 
in a deposit account may be made effective against third parties by registration even 
when the deposit account is original collateral (recommendation 49), the secured 
creditor who has obtained control has priority even against a prior registered secured 
creditor (recommendation 103). See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2. 
20   U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(4) (2014).  
21   Id. at § 9-607(a)(5). 
22   Id. at § 9-607, cmt. 7.  
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creditors who have obtained control are likewise entitled to self-help 
collection rights without the need for judicial intervention. 
As between the depository bank and outside secured creditors 
who seek to perfect a security right in a deposit account by control, the 
control regime privileges the depository bank. The depository bank is 
not obligated to enter into a control agreement with an outside secured 
creditor, even if its customer so requests, and even if it does not itself 
hold a security right in the account.23  If the bank does agree to enter 
into a control agreement, any security right the bank obtains in the 
deposit account has priority even if the control agreement was 
concluded before the bank acquired its security right.24  So in practice 
the outside secured creditor will also need to obtain the agreement of 
the depository bank to waive its priority. 
In theory, an outside secured creditor can be assured of priority 
over the depository bank by relying on the alternative method of 
control: becoming the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit 
account.25 This method of control gives it priority over any security 
interest acquired by the bank26 and terminates the bank’s set-off right 
for any claims it has against the debtor.27 However, this method of 
control requires the cooperation of the bank, so in practice the bank’s 
consent to waive its priority is needed.28 Nor is this method of control 
a feasible one for operating accounts to which the debtor needs regular 
access.29 
III.        OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SPECIAL CONTROL RULES 
The official justifications for the Article 9 control rules are not 
particularly convincing. With respect to the priority enjoyed by control 
secured creditors over those who have perfected by registration, the 
                                                 
23   Id. at § 9-342. 
24   Id. at § 9-327(3). 
25   Id. at § 9-104(a)(3). 
26   Id. at § 9-327(4). 
27   Id. at § 9-340(c).  
28   See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under Revised Article 9 
Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 844 (2005). 
29   Markell, supra note 6, at 987; see also G.R. Warner, Deposit Accounts as 
Collateral under Revised Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (Aug. 2000).  
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Official Comment states that secured creditors “for whom the deposit 
account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum, 
insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon 
the debtor’s default (i.e., control)” whereas those “for whom the 
deposit account is less essential will not take control.”30 The 
implication here seems to be that a secured creditor who demonstrates 
special reliance by taking the extra steps needed to obtain control 
should be rewarded for its efforts by a special priority.31 But this 
justification is predicated on circular reasoning, since a secured creditor 
would not have to take these extra steps if priority were instead 
predicated on the basis of the order of registration of the security 
rights. 
With respect to the priority generally enjoyed by the bank over 
outside secured creditors, the Official Comment explains that a “rule 
of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without 
the need to examine either the public record or their own records to 
determine whether another party might have a security interest in the 
deposit account.”32  But this is a conclusory statement, not a 
justification.  After all, all secured creditors would wish to be assured 
of receiving an automatic super-priority over prior-perfected secured 
creditors. Why privilege depository banks over other suppliers of 
secured credit? 
With respect to the automatic control enjoyed by the 
depository bank by virtue of its status, the official comment states that 
public notice is unnecessary since all actual and potential creditors are 
always on notice that the bank may assert a claim by virtue of its set-
off rights against the deposit account.33 The implication here is that 
awarding automatic control and a special priority to a depository 
bank’s security right does not put third parties in a more 
                                                 
30   U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 3 (2014). 
31   For an argument suggesting that this is the justification for control 
super-priority, see Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules 
74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1157 (1999).  
32   U.C.C. § 9-327, cmt. 4 (2014). 
33   Id. at § 9‐ 104, cmt. 3 (“No other form of public notice is necessary; 
all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with 
which the debtor’s deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the 
deposit account.”). 
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disadvantageous position than they already occupy.  It is true that set-
off is not a security interest and as such is not subject to any public 
registration or other public notice requirement. However, a bank can 
only set-off obligations already owing to it by its customer at the time 
it receives notice of a competing claim.34 The concept of automatic 
control, combined with the special priority accorded to the depository 
bank’s security right, dispenses with the need for the bank to first 
ascertain whether notice has been received before extending credit and 
eliminates the potential for litigation concerning the relative timing of 
the receipt of notice and the extension of credit.35  It follows that the 
concept of automatic control without the need for public notice 
cannot be explained simply as a neutral and logical application of the 
consequences of set off.  Rather, it enhances the bank’s position 
relative to the set-off rights of other obligors. 
With respect to the right of the bank to refuse to disclose 
whether control has been obtained by an outside secured creditor, the 
Official Comment explains that this protects banks “from the need to 
respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.”36  But 
requiring outside secured creditors to register notice of their security 
rights would equally relieve the bank from that burden while also 
serving to ensure public notice to competing creditors and other 
claimants. 
IV.         JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPORTING THE ARTICLE 9 CONTROL 
REGIME INTO CANADIAN LAW 
Writing in 2000, some Canadian commentators concluded that 
there was no justification for importing the Article 9 regime for deposit 
accounts into Canadian law.37 Why, they asked, should depository 
institutions be exempt from the general registration requirements and 
first-to-register priority rules applicable to the holders of security rights 
in other intangible obligations? And why should they enjoy what 
                                                 
34   See, e.g., CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 664.   
35   See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 139, ¶ 144. 
36   U.C.C. § 9‐ 342, cmt 2 (2014). 
37   Ronald C.C. Cuming & Catherine Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Implications for the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 16 BANKING 
FIN. L. REV. 339, 364-68 (2001). 
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amounts in effect to a veto over the ability of a debtor to give an 
effective security interest in its deposit account to an outside creditor 
when the existing law, including the depository bank’s rights of set-off, 
would seem to offer it adequate protection against interference with 
ordinary banking practices? 
In recent years, the tide of opinion in Canada has swung 
heavily in favor of adoption of the Article 9 control approach.38 
Indeed, the province of Quebec already has introduced legislation to 
that end, and reforms are pending in the other provinces and 
territories.39 
A significant catalyst for the pending reforms was the 2009 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Caisse populaire Desjardins 
de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada.40 In that case, a customer had deposited 
$200,000 with a credit union subject to contractual terms that 
prevented the customer from withdrawing the deposit before the 
expiry of a five-year term and entitled the credit union to set-off any 
obligations owing under the line of credit it had extended to the 
customer and to refuse repayment of the deposit for the duration of 
the line of credit agreement.41 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that, while a mere 
contractual set-off right without more is not a security interest, the 
arrangement must be characterized as a security agreement in 
substance when a contractual set-off right is combined with other 
contractual terms designed to prevent the customer from withdrawing 
or otherwise dealing with the funds in its account until its own 
                                                 
38   See Ontario Bar Association, Perfecting Security Interests in Cash Collateral 
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at  
https://www.oba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=c020380c-6c0a-496f-b4b1-
b44d6ac07eb5. 
39 See Michel Deschamps, Mathieu Dubord & Mary Jeanne Phelan, New 
Regime in Quebec for Security on Bank Deposits and Other Monetary Claims, MCCARTHY 
TETRAULT (May 15, 2015), http:// 
http://www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=7105. See also ONTARIO MINISTRY 
OF GOVERNMENT AND CONSUMER SERVICES, BUSINESS LAW AGENDA: PRIORITY 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT 9 (2015).  
40   Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada, [2009] 
2 S.C.R. 94 (Can.). 
41   Id. 
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obligations to the bank are satisfied.42 Although the decision related to 
the concept of security for the purposes of income tax legislation, it 
was widely seen as jeopardizing the use of “cash collateral” in the form 
of a customer’s right to the payment of money credited to a deposit 
account in the context of derivatives and securities lending 
transactions.43 Participants in these markets had thought they might 
protect their priority in “cash collateral” transactions by relying on 
“flawed asset” contractual arrangements under which the customer 
agrees that money deposited by the customer is not repayable until the 
occurrence of specified events. If these arrangements, as the Drummond 
case correctly implied,44 are characterized as giving rise to a security 
right in substance, it follows that they are required to be perfected by 
registration, and will be subordinated to any prior-registered 
competing security right unless the secured creditor obtains a 
subordination agreement.45 In contrast, adoption of an Article 9 
control approach would enable secured creditors and particularly 
banks to obtain a first ranking security right to deposit accounts in cash 
collateral transactions without the need to register and without any risk 
of subordination to prior-registered secured creditors. Consequently, 
in the wake of the Drummond decision, the financial industry stepped 
up its lobbying efforts to import the Article 9 treatment of deposit 
accounts into Canadian law46 with success now imminent. 
  
                                                 
42   Id. 
43   See, e.g., Anthony Duggan, The Australian PPSA From a Canadian 
Perspective: Some Comparative Reflections 11-13 (U. Toronto Law, Working Paper No. 
2014-03, 2014), available at 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/Duggan/WPS%202014-
3.pdf. 
44   CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 7, at 667, 143-46. 
45   Duggan, supra note 43, at 12. 
46   See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION 
(ISDA), ISDA LETTER TO ALBERTA AND ONTARIO GOVERNMENTS RE PROPOSAL 
FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS UNDER THE PPSA 
(Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/regions/canada/page/3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever the official explanation for the Article 9 control 
approach, the recent Canadian experience suggests that its primary 
purpose is to facilitate the use of deposit accounts in cash collateral 
transactions in derivatives and other financial markets. Dispensing 
with the public registration requirements and registration based 
temporal priority rules that traditionally have informed Canadian 
secured transactions law will come at a cost to creditors in the real 
economy. For example, secured creditors who finance a commercial 
debtor’s operating costs, including its acquisition of inventory, will no 
longer be able to rely on registration to give them an enforceable 
security right in the debtor’s deposit account. They will need to 
undergo the additional expense and effort of obtaining control, 
including negotiating the agreement of the bank with which the 
account is maintained to waive its own priority. Unsecured creditors 
are also disadvantaged. At present, they can determine whether it is 
worth their time and expense to obtain a judgment and garnish their 
debtors’ deposit accounts by searching the registry to verify whether 
any security rights have been granted in those accounts. While these 
creditors still would be subject to any set off rights enjoyed by the 
bank, they would at least know that those set off rights would be 
limited to the credit extended to the bank at the time of enforcement 
against the bank. 
Recent scholarship argues that, while facilitating the extension 
of secured credit has a positive impact on economic growth when it is 
directed to the real economy, its effect when channeled to the financial 
economy may be destructive, generating price bubbles and subsequent 
debt deflation.47 If that argument is correct, we may yet come to regret 
dismantling the general requirements of secured transactions law in 
order to facilitate the extension of credit based on deposit account 
collateral in financial markets48 while increasing the cost of and thereby 
                                                 
47   For an analysis of the scholarship, see Richter, supra note 3. 
48   Id. at 10-11 (discussing the Financial Collateral Directive in the 
European Union, which, in a similar vein to the Article 9 control regime, seeks to 
exempt financial collateral from most of the formal requirements traditionally 
imposed on security arrangements).  
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diminishing the extension of credit to financers of real economy 
services and products.49  
 
                                                 
49   This is not to reject altogether the proposition that some protection of 
the finality of ‘cash collateral’ transactions in financial markets may be justified to 
contain systemic risk. Rather, it is a plea for a more nuanced and targeted modality. 
In this respect, consider, for example, the amendments effected to the Canadian 
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (S.C. 1996, c. 6, Sch.) in 2012 to add a provision (s. 
8(1)(c)) to protect the finality of payments made or property delivered or transferred 
“in accordance with the settlement rules of designated clearing and settlement 
systems” notwithstanding anything in any Canadian or provincial statute (including 
provincial secured transactions statutes). 
